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8	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT			
9	NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA			
10	SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION			
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12	KEVIN EMBRY, an individ himself, the general public at		CASE NO.	CV-09-1808 JW
13	situated			ORER OVERRULING OBJECTIONS OF CHRISTOPHER BANDAS
14	Plaintiff,			
15	V.		Time: 9:00	
16	ACER AMERICA CORPOR	RATION; AND DOE		rtroom 15, 18 <sup>th</sup> Floor n. James Ware
17	1 THROUGH 50			
18	Defendants			
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Prior to the final approval hearing, Christopher Bandas filed a timely objection to the settlement and notice of his intent to appear at the final approval hearing. (Docket No. 199.) Mr. Bandas did not in fact appear. Having considered Mr. Bandas' written objections, they are overruled for the reasons stated below.

Mr. Bandas first objected that the Class Counsel was obligated to submit time records to support a fee award. The law is to the contrary. *See Lytle v. Carl*, 382 F.3d 978, 989 (9th Cir. 2004) (detailed time records not required); *Faigman v. AT&T*, 2011 WL 672648 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (declaration sufficient); *Wershba v. Apple Computer*, 91 Cal. App. 4th 224, 255 (2001) ("California case law permits fee awards in the absence of detailed time sheets"); *see also Fiori et al v. Dell, Inc, et al*, 5:09-cv-01518-JW (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2011, Dkt.## 212, 216) (rejecting same argument by Bandas' attorney, Joseph D. Palmer).

Bandas next objected that this settlement is a "coupon" settlement requiring "heightened scrutiny" and that the award of fees should be deferred until all claims have been submitted. The Court disagrees with both the premises and the conclusion. This settlement is not a "coupon" settlement as it provides "no coupon, voucher or discount that would partly defray the cost of making a new purchase of goods or services from the defendant" or that "might induce a the [class] member to make a purchase he or she would not otherwise have made, which may actually produce a net benefit for the defendant." *Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.*, 162 Cal. App. 4th 43 (2008). Rather, class members get free software, hardware, repairs or cash. Nor do coupon settlements require "heightened scrutiny," as the standard for approval of such settlements under the Class Action Fairness Act appears to be identical to that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e). Compare 28 USC § 1712(e) ("In a proposed settlement under which class members would be awarded coupons, the court may approve the proposed settlement only after a hearing to determine whether, and making a written finding that, the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate for class members.") to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2) ("If the proposal would bind class members, the court may approve it only after a hearing and on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate."). Even were "heightened scrutiny" required, Bandas does not explain why the settlement would fail to survive such scrutiny. As this Court explained in its Order granting final

## approval (Docket No. 218), the settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate, and Class Counsel's request for fees should be approved based on the lodestar-multiplier and cross-check methods. Bandas finally argues that the existence of a "quick pay" provision "may" create a conflict between Class Counsel and the Class. Based on the declarations of counsel, the Court finds that terms regarding attorneys' fees were not negotiated until after agreement as to all other substantive terms. Thus, the Court is not persuaded that any such conflict exists here. Accordingly, all of Mr. Bandas' objections are OVERRULED. IT IS SO ORDERED this \_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 2012. HON. JAMES WARE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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